Introduction
File fragment classificationdthe process of mapping a sample chunk of data, such as a disk block, to a specific type of data encodingdhas been the focus of substantial research efforts for over a decade. Unfortunately, the practical results of all this work have been underwhelming, at best. This purpose of this work is to: a) clearly spell out the research problem; b) identify explicit tool requirements based on usage scenarios; and c) present the empirical background work behind a new classification tool called zsniff.
Motivation
Most digital forensic and incident response professional can look (through a hex editor) at a piece of binary data, such as a disk block or a network packet, and readily identify what kind of data it carries. This skill is developed with experience, and can be very helpful in a variety of forensic tasks, such as diagnosing break-ins, making sense of residual data, decoding memory dumps, reverseengineering malware, data recovery, and so on.
The problem is that manual examination does not scale and we need automated tools to perform this fragment classification. Once we have a tool that can successfully classify fragments, it can be used to: statistically sample target during triage (Garfinkel et al.) , improve file carving (Richard and Roussev, 2005) accuracy, screen network traffic, and provide context for other subsequent forensic processing (e.g., indexing).
Requirements
Based on the scenarios in the previous section, we identify the following main requirements for a fragment classifier:
Accuracy. This is always the primary requirement with any classification problem; however, we posit that digital forensic applications require near-perfect classification rates. The main problem are terabyte-scale targets, where even 95% accuracy would produce an unacceptable number of false positive/negative results.
Line-speed performance. Methods should be fast enough to keep up with bulk data transfers from secondary storage and commodity networks: 100 MB/s and up.
Reliable error rate estimates. Every classifier should have well-studied error rates based on large and representative studies, preferably on a standardized, public data set.
Clear results. Classifiers need to recognize their own limitations, and communicate their level of confidence in the results. This will allow users and higher-level analytical tools to better understand what encoding classification can and cannot do.
Related work
Most work on file fragment identification to date has attempted to solve the classification problem using a combination of machine learning techniques and statistical analysis. Researchers typically assemble a corpus of files of different types. The corpus is divided into two groups, a "training set" and a "test set." The files in the training set are processed with some sort of statistical technique and the results are fed into a traditional machine learning algorithm. The results are used to create a classifier. The test set is then fed into the classifier and its ability to classify is measured and finally reported.
Byte frequency distribution
McDaniel and Heydari (2003) considers the identification of file fragments based on techniques other than header/footer analysis. His basic approach was to create for each file a histogram of the frequency of ASCII codes in the file to be classified. This histogram is turned into a 256-element vector; the vectors representing each file type were then clustered. McDaniel's corpus consisted of 120 files from 30 different file types; only whole files were considered.
Plain byte frequency distribution (BFD) analysis yields rather unconvincing results: 27.50% true positive rate for the BFA algorithm and 46% for the BFC algorithm. McDaniel proposed an alternative approach that created a file type fingerprint based on a correlation of byte positions and the ASCII value at that position. This approach achieved a respectable 96% success ratedbut careful analysis shows that it was simply a variation on the traditional header/ footer analysis and would not work for classifying arbitrary file fragments.
The next important piece of work belongs to Li et al. who substantially revamped the BFD approach. The basic idea is to use a centroid, or multiple centroids, derived from the byte frequency distribution as the signature of a file type. But Li's published evaluation did not evaluate the approach on fragments drawn from the middle of a file. Instead, the fragments all started at the beginning of the file with evaluation points at 20, 200, 500, 1000 bytes, as well as the whole file. Interestingly enough, the 20-byte fragments were identified with near perfection, yet the accuracy of the same approach applied to entire files drops significantlyddown to 77% for whole jpeg files. This is a puzzling and unexplained resultdusing more data yields less accurate results.
Karresand and Shahmehri developed a very similar centroid idea to Li's and called it the Oscar method. This was shortly extended with the introduction of a new metric called rate-of-change (RoC), which was defined as the difference of the values of consecutive bytes. The latter is not truly a generic feature, rather it is suitable for detecting jpeg-encoded data only. The reason this works is due to a quirk of the jpeg format, which utilizes byte stuffing. The 0xFF is used as an escape character marking the beginning of all metadata tags; thus, an extra 0x00 is placed after every 0xFF byte in the body of the file. This produces a reliable and highly characteristic patternd0xFF00dwhich has a very high RoC. Apart from jpeg, RoC does nothing to improve the rather modest classification success of other file formats considered. For Windows executables, the false positive rate actually exceeded the detection rate for most points shown, (Karresand and Shahmehri) Fig. 3 , although the peak detection rate of 70% is equal to a false positive rate of 70%. For zip files, things look a little better with false positive rate of 70% when the detection rate reaches 100%; (Karresand and Shahmehri) Fig. 4 .
Statistical approaches
Erbacher and Mulholland argue that one could differentiate among the formats by taking a purely statistical perspective of the file container by using standard statistical measurementdaverages, distributions, and higher momentum statistical measurements. Unfortunately, the argument is rather thinly supported by plotting the behavior of these measurements over several specific files.
Follow-up work by Moody and Erbacher (2008) attempts to develop a general methodology based on the observations. Unfortunately, the proposed statistics can only distinguish broad classes of data encodings, such as textual, executable code, and compressed, but becomes easily confused in trying to pick out more subtle differencesde.g., csv vs. html vs. txt. Secondary analysis is made to make a finer distinction with mixed results. Veenman (2007) combined the BFD with Shannon entropy and Kolmogorov complexity measures as the basis for his classification approach. To his credit, he used a nontrivial (450 MB) evaluation corpus, employed 11 different file formats, and his formulation of the problemdidentify the container format for a 4096 byte fragmentdwas the closest to our view of how the analysis should be performed. The classification success for most was quite modest: between 18% for zip and 78% for executables. The only standouts were html with 99% and jpg with 98% recognition rates.
Calhoun and Coles expanded upon Veenman's work by employing a set of additional measures (16 total) and combinations of them. While the test sets were smalld50 fragment per file typedhe recognized the need for more subtle testing and performed all-pairs comparison of three compressed formats: jpeg, gif, and pdf. Another positive in this work is that header data is not considered so the results are not skewed by the presence of metadata.
The improved evaluation methodology (with the notable exception of sample size) provides one of the first realistic evaluations of generic metrics-based approaches.
Provided true positive rates for the binary classification are between 60% and 86% for the different metrics, implying false positives in the 14-40% range.
More recent work has targeted incremental improvements but has not produced any ground breaking ideas. Due to space limitations, we will stop heredwell short of a comprehensive survey of the field.
Redefining the problem
Overall, prior work in the area of fragment classification exhibits two critical problems: a) it fails to provide a workable problem formulation that is in line with real-world file formats; and b) it fails to provide an appropriate evaluation framework and reproducible results.
In many respects the latter is a consequence of the former, so our first task is to properly state the problem we are trying to solve. The basic conceptual problem is that researchers have continually confused the notions of file type and data encoding. The purpose of this section is to differentiate between the two, and to derive a correct problem formulation that enables scientific evaluation and interpretation of the classification results.
Application file types
Let us start with the basic notion of a file. A file is a sequence of bytes that is stored by a file system under a userspecified name Historically, operating systems have avoided interpreting the names and contents of files; however, every operating system needs to be able to at least determine if a file is executable. For that purpose, it uses a combination of file naming conventions and a magic numberdfile type-specific binary string at the beginning of a filedto perform sanity checking before attempting execution. For example, CP/M and MS-DOS will load any file with extension .com into memory and execute it, if the file's name is typed; MS Windows marks the beginning of executables with the string MZ; Linux marks the beginning of executables with the hexadecimal string 7f 45 4c 46, and so on.
For modern, more user friendly, operating systems it became helpful to associate data files with the corresponding applications so that actions like 'open', 'new', and 'print' could be initiated by the user from the OS interface. This loose association between file naming and applications is what the operating system presents to end-users as a 'file type'.
It is important to recognize that this is not a particularly useful definition from a forensic perspective. Under the hood, the internal data representation of a file type can change radically between application versions. Moreover, compound file formats can have dramatically different content and, consequently, look very different at the bit stream level. For example, an MS Powerpoint presentation document could be primarily text, or it could include a lot of photos, scanned images, audio/video files, spreadsheets, etc. Since the individual components have different encodings, the layout of the data in the file would be very different in each of these cases.
The latter observation directly contradicts the central belief of prevalent machine-learning-based methods that an application-defined file type has characteristic statistical attributes that are useful for classification purposes. Such an assumption works to a certain extent for simple formats, like ASCII text, but is patently wrong in the general case. Therefore, we must rebuild the definition of a file type from the ground up, starting with the definition of primitive data encodings.
Data encodings and file types
A data encoding is a set of rules for mapping pieces of data to a sequences of bits. Such an encoding is primitive, if it is not possible to reduce the rule set and still produce meaningful data encodings.
The same piece of information can be represented in different ways using different encodings. For example, a plain text document could be represented in ASCII for editing, and in compressed form for storage/transmission. Once encoded, the resulting bit stream can serve as the source for further (recursive) encodings; e.g., a base64-encoded jpeg image.
A file type is a set of rules for utilizing (sets of) primitive data encodings to serialize digital artifacts Unlike data encodings, file types can have very loose, ambiguous, and extensible set of rules, especially for complex file types. Consider the breakdown of recursively embedded MS Office objects found inside a set of w20,000 MS Office (Table 3) . A Word document may contain a Powerpoint presentation, which in turn may contain Excel spreadsheet, which may contain OLE objects, and so on. To correctly discover the entire stack of embeddings, one needs the entire file as a frame of reference. Contrast that to our problem, where we have a (small) fragment to work with.
Even the simple (but common) case of including png/ jpeg-encoded images in a compound document illustrates the inadequacy of the status quo. For example, assume that method A advertises that it can correctly classify pdf fragments of 1024 bytes in size 80% of the time and it misclassifies them as jpeg pieces 15% of the time. Is this a good method to adopt, or not? The answer is unknowable:
On the one hand, maybe the method only gets confused when the fragment is entirely jpeg-encoded so the 15% confusion is just bad reporting on part of the author and should be added to the 80% true positives.
On the other hand, if the sample evaluation set were heavily text-based with many deflate-encoded parts, this would be a rather poor method as it is relatively easy to separate jpeg-and deflate-coded streams.
Also, how will the method perform if we encounter a group of fax-encoded scanned documents?
Due to the poor problem formulation, we have no real basis to understand the performance of the method. Yet, one can find multiple examples (e.g., Calhoun and Coles) where researchers treat compound file types as primitive data encodings and produce effectively meaningless classification rates and confusion matrices.
Problem statement
We submit that file fragment classification problems consists of three autonomous sub-problems. Given a sample fragment, a classifier should be able to answer the following questions:
1. What is the primitive data encoding of the fragment? 2. Does the encoding contain recursive encodings? 3. Is the fragment part of a compound file structure?
(The second question is strictly optional but is often interesting for simple encodings. For example, identifying a fragment as being base64-encoded is trivial but not very informative; discovering that it encodes an image, or text is substantially more useful.)
Note that we can always make a meaningful effort to answer the first two questions. Our ability to answer the third one depends, to a much larger degree, on luck as the fragment must contain enough characteristic data from the container.
By splitting the problem into three separate questions, we can begin to build a meaningful and informative evaluation framework. The split also means that establishing the ground truth becomes much more complicated than simply collecting a set of files with a given extensiondwe need to parse the contents of our reference files to know exactly what is in each evaluation sample.
Evidently, the size of a fragment is a crucial evaluation parameter and performance can vary greatly. At the extremes, if the fragment is too small, there will not be enough data to work with; as the fragment gets big the results may get noisier as multiple encodings may be detected.
Another aspect of the evaluation process is defining the required level of specificity. For the same piece of data, we can often provide multiple classification in increasing order of specificityde.g., text / xml / mathmldand classifiers should aim for the most specific result.
Finally, we submit that the true test of a classification method is to be performed on independent fragment samples that contain no header information. This is not to suggest that identifying headers is useless but that a header sample is the outlier case that is readily solvable with some basic parsing code.
Design of zsniff
The overall goal of our work is to build zsniffdan extensible classification framework, populate it with a set of high-quality classifiers for the most common data encodings, and leave it open to further extensions.
Some of the classifiers are inherently more compute intensive. Therefore, our plan is to build a tree of classifiersdfrom the most generic to more specific ones that (hopefully) filter out most poor candidates based on easy to compute attributes.
For the rest of the section we briefly discuss the various classes of known useful classifiers, and focus most of our attention on the deflate classifier, which we have developed. We omit all discussion on text classification, as this is a mature subject by now.
Simple classifiers
The purpose of simple classifiers is to provide a quick and general classification; based on the results, more specific (and computationally expensive) classifiers are chosen for follow-up work. Below are a couple of examples of these:
Entropy
Shannon's classical formula allows us to quickly place the observed (probability distribution of) data into three useful categories: low, medium, and high entropy. All compressed, encrypted, and random data would exhibit high entropy; text and codedmedium; and sparse data, such as large tables, logs, etc., are usually of low entropy.
Base16/32/64/85
These are simple classifiers that detect the most common binary-to-text encodings. The detection is straight forward as each encoding uses a well-defined range of ASCII codes. Once identified, the blocks using these encodings can be converted to binary and sent back to the beginning of the pipeline for second-order classification.
N-gram classifiers
N-gram classifiers rely on characteristic strings that can provide both definitive classification and more subtle clues, such as the use of specific markup. These classifiers are particularly useful in identifying format keywords for toplevel containers, and are often the only reliable clue in that regard.
Format parsers & verifiers
Format parsers look for synchronization markers in the input and attempt to parse the remaining data according to the format rules for the particular encoding. Since this is meant to be a fast process, the parser will not attempt full decoding of the data. Additional sanity checks can be applied to data to reduce errors as illustrated by the following example classifiers:
Mp3 encoding is classification-friendly and is representative of a broader class of audio/video containers. An mp3 file consists of a sequence of independent, selfcontained mp3 frames. The beginning of a frame is marked by 12 consecutive bits set to 1da synchronization markerd that are certain not to appear anywhere else in the encoded stream. Following the synchronization bits is information about the version, bit rate, sample rate, and padding. Based on these parameters we can calculate the length of the frame and predict the appearance of the next header (Roussev and Garfinkel) .
There are several criteria that allows the confirmation/ rejection of the fragment as mp3-encoded. First, the predictable appearance of the frame headerdfor a fixed-rate encoding this will be almost periodic. Next, not all combinations of parameters in the frame header are legal, and even fewer are actually seen in the wild. Consecutive frames may be encoded at different bit rate but little else changes from frame to frame.
Jpeg header recognition is relatively easy to accomplishdthe header has a variable length record structure in which synchronization markers are followed by the length of the field. Thus, some simple 'header hopping' can reliably identify the header, much like in the mp3 case.
Jpeg body recognition is also not difficult to accomplish as the encoding uses byte stuffing that results in the 16-bit hexadecimal FF00 occurring every 191 bytes, on average (Roussev and Garfinkel) . Placed next to a high-entropy sample with a different encoding, like deflate, this feature sticks out rather prominently and can be incorporated into the classifier in a number of ways. This can be done quickly and efficiently, and we consider this a solved problem.
Deflate classifier
Our starting assumption is that the methods described are applied to high-entropy data, and the real problem is separating the various types of compressed data, and to distinguish them from encrypted/random data.
The deflate classifier is the main contribution of this work and seeks to: a) identify deflate-coded data; and b) distinguish among different types of underlying data.
The zlib/deflate encoding (RFC, 1950 (RFC, /1951 ) is entirely focused on storage efficiency and contains the absolute minimal amount of metadata necessary for decoding. It consists of a sequence of compressed blocks, each one comprised of:
3-bit header. The first bit indicates whether this is the last block in the sequence; the following two bits define how the data is coded: raw (uncompressed), static Huffman, or dynamic Huffman. In practice, dynamic Huffman is present 99.5% of the time (Roussev and Garfinkel) ).
Huffman tables. These describe the Huffman code books used in the particular block.
Compressed data. The table is followed by a stream of variable-length Huffman codes that represent the content of the block. One of the codes is reserved for marking the end of the block.
As soon as the end-of-block code is read from the stream, the next bit is the beginning of the following block headerdthere is no break in the bit stream between blocks, and there are no synchronization markers of any kind. The end-of-block code depends on the coding table, so it varies from block to block. The upshot is that, absent sanity checking, a deflate decoder can sometimes "decode" even random data.
Using prior open source deflate implementations as a base, we built a robust, stubborn, and heavily instrumented Cþþ version of the deflate decoder. Robust means that we can throw any data at the decoder and it will either successfully decode it, or fail gracefully.
Stubborn means that the decoder will successively attempt to decode the given data starting at every bit offset. While this is a brute-force approach, we see no alternatives. One shortcut is that virtually all deflate blocks in the wild use dynamic Huffman, which means that we have a two-bit header pattern we can key off, saving us 75% of the work.
Once we have found a candidate block header, we attempt to decode the Huffman tables that should be present in a correct block. Using a combination of parsing failures and sanity checks on decoded tables, we eliminate most candidates within a few hundred bytes, so the attempt is relatively cheap.
If the tables are deemed correct, we proceed to decode the block until we reach the end-of-block marker and restart the decoding process. One nice side effect of this behavior is that deflate data does not need to be separated from other (differently coded) data a priori.
We instrumented the decoder to output the decoded tables, as well as block boundaries, and this data serves as the basis for our empirical analysis of deflate data that follows.
We analyze the content of three different types of deflate-encoded types of data. The goal is to establish ground truth with respect to what is feasible to achieve based on block size, and to search for characteristic patterns in the Huffman tables that would allow robust classification.
Analysis of MS Office 2007 files
We start with an empirical analysis of MS Office 2007 filesddocx, xlsx, and pptxdwhich we refer to as msx files.
Data sample
Since we are not aware of any public data set that provides an appropriate sample, we created our own, called MSX-13 (Table 1) .
We built it using the results of a popular search engine to identify approximately 10,000 candidate documents of each type. Due to search engine restrictions, it is difficult to obtain more than 1000 results per query. Therefore, we ran 10 instances of the same query with different site restrictions. We used queries of the form ext:<file_type> site:<tld>, where <file_type> ¼ docxjxlsxjpptx, and <tld> ¼ comjnetjorgjedujgovjusjukjcajaujnz.
In other words, we asked for a collection of files based on file type, with no particular keyword. The split along TLDs ensures that the results do not overlap and the chosen TLDs heavily favor English documents. Once downloaded, the sample files were validated to ensure correctness. A detailed description of the data set is available at http:// roussev.net/msx-13.
Content
Broadly, msx files are zip files that consist of deflateencoded files/components (almost entirely in xml), and embedded media content that is stored in its original (compressed) encoding. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the major components based on four statistics: countdthe total number of components of the given type; avg sizedaverage size per component; total sizedthe total volume of all components of the given type; and percent of total, which provides the fraction (by volume) of all components relative to the size of the respective data set. The first category of componentsdreferred to as deflatedrepresent all deflate-coded objects. The remaining categories represent stored objects in their native encodingdjpeg, png, gif, and tiff represent image data, the other category encompasses embedded msx documents, fonts, audio/video, and a tiny number of unclassified.
Observations Although the three file formats share a common design (and some components), the actual content differs substantially.
Xlsx data is dominated (84%) by deflate content and has the highest average size of deflate objects, whereas the other two are dominated by embedded images with 66% (docx) and 83% (pptx) of content.
Generally, small objects (deflate) are good news as the beginning/end have readily identifiable markers and can save us deeper analysis. Jpeg content is also good news as it can be identified quite reliably.
Png content, quite extensive in docx/pptx data, is not good newsdit consists of deflate-coded image data. Consequently, we need deeper analysis to distinguish it from deflate-coded xml data.
As already mentioned earlier, msx objects can be embedded recursively, which creates additional challenges. Table 3 shows a breakdown of all embedded objects found in our test data; each row represents the number of embedded objects of the given type on each of the host file types. The bin group consists almost entirely (98.5%) of OLE objects, which are stored deflate-compressed.
The most important takeaway is that one size is unlikely to fit all and, most likely, we need a whole bag of tricks to correctly classify the msx formats.
Format keywords
One simple and effective means to reliably classify fragments is to find keywords (n-grams) that are highly characteristic of the encoding. In this case, the overall data format is a generic (zip) archive; however, the file/directory structure of its content is highly characteristic. We used our data set to empirically derive the most useful keyword roots from the names of the constituent files. The result are as follows: docxd23 keywords (of the form word/*); xlsxd22 keywords (xl/*); pptxd21 keywords (ppt/*); msxdfive keywords common to all three formats. With one exception, all keywords are between 8 and 13 characters.
For the next study (Table 4) , we identified the keyword locations on our test set, and calculated the fraction of blocks that contain a keyword for several block sizes.
The results show that, for small block sizes, it is inherently difficult to unambiguously classify msx blocks. (Recall that only blocks containing the keywords can be unambiguously attributed to msx documentsdthe rest is compressed xml and media data.) At 64KiB, almost 1/4 of the average file size for docx/xlsx, the classification rate approaches 50% and starts to become a practical, low-cost approach.
It is useful to understand what is the main contributor to the relatively low efficiency of keyword searches for small block sizes. Since this is effectively a function of component file sizes, one possible explanation is that (presumably bigger) embedded media files are the main reason. To test, we split each of the file sets into two subsetsdthose that contain media, and those that do notdand compared the detection rates. We found that the hypothesized effect is real but small, and does not account for our observations. Instead, we studied the effects of large components by comparing the ratio of the size of the largest component file to the size of the entire document. Fig. 1 shows the empirical distribution for the entire docx set; note that both axes are logarithmic.
With respect to absolute size of the maximum sized component we see an approximately linear relationship with overall file size. This confirms our hypothesis that larger files are more difficult to classify.
In summary, components for msx files routinely exceed the size of most fragment sizes of interest, which places inherent restrictions on our ability to perform keywordbased classification and, by extension, unambiguous file type identification.
Compressed block distribution
The next step is to dig deeper and start looking at our chances of identifying data encodings. We consider the distribution of deflate compressed blocks sizes. This data can help us relate fragment size and classifier performance. Fig. 2 plots the cumulative distribution of compressed block sizes for four different deflated-coded data samples. The docx and xlsx statistics are based on the 3191 docx and 1291 xlsx files from MSX-13 that do not contain embedded media (the png and exe/dll data are discussed in later sections).
For docx, a 1/4/16KiB fragment has a respective 65.6/ 90.2/99.6% chance of containing a whole block. For xlsx, the numbers are 35.9/47.4/94.9%. The practical significance of these percentages that they place an effective upper limit on the performance of deflate classifiers for docx/xlsx classifiers.
Alternatively, we can say that we need a minimum of 18KiB fragment to afford near-perfect chance of detecting any present msx deflate block.
Analysis of png files
The png image format is a primitive data encoding that utilizes deflate as its last step of the compression process. In other words, it contains no overt (statistical) features that can be used to distinguish it from compressed xml data, for example. The rest of this section is an empirical search for classification criteria to separate the two.
First, we find the distribution of compressed block sizes (Fig. 2) . Clearly, the distribution is more spread out, with only 81.5% of compressed blocks below the 18KiB threshold established in the prior section. However, block sizes do top out around 48KiB, so a fragment of that size should be classifiable, if appropriate criteria are found.
In search of such criteria, we plot (Fig. 3 ) the cumulative distribution of the number of valid (Huffman) code table values for the 256 ASCII characters vs. the corresponding distribution for the msx files discussed in the previous section (exe/dll is discussed later).
We can see very clear differences that have classification valuedany code table of size 60, and less, almost certainly indicates a png block, whereas any code table of size 140, and higher, indicates that it is not png. Together, these two ranges cover about 30% of all observed code tables. By looking at the p.d.f. (omitted here) we can cover another 30% of the range where the difference in probabilities is substantial and will yield a reliable distinction criterion. Yet, for the rest, code table size is not enough. It is time to consider code table content. To bootstrap the decoding process, the Huffman table must define a bit string code for every byte value (0-255) that will be needed. For msx blocks, this means defining a code for every ASCII character in use. Since this is a limited range, we can hope that it would be different than the one for png, which is encoding pixels. Fig. 4 shows, for each ASCII code, what is the empirical probability that it will be defined (docx/xlsx shown with bars to accommodate large jumps between neighbors). For example, for png, code 0 appears with probability 0.9778, whereas for docx/xlsx, that number is 0.0005. At the same time, for code 115 ('s'), we have 0.9991 for docx, 0.6900 for xlsx, and 0.2559 for png.
The chart illustrates the opportunity for near-perfect distinction between png deflate-encoded data and deflate-encoded text/markup. Follow up work needs to establish the shortest and most reliable combinations of codes to place in the classifier.
Analysis of deflate-coded PE files
Let us briefly examine what happens to deflate-encoded Windows portable executables (PE). This is relevant as installation packages are often deflate-encoded. Following the analysis template from the previous section, we placed 1000 exe/dll files from C:\Windows\system32 into a zip archive and looked at the resulting Huffman code table statistics.
First, the distribution of code table sizes (Fig. 3) . It is very clear that compressed PE files exhibit the cdf of a narrow, bell-shaped distribution with 98.7% of the mass concentrated in the 110-140 range.
Next, we consider the distribution of valid codes in the table (Fig. 4) , which also exhibit a very regular and recognizable signature. Specifically, the codes in the 0-114 range show a uniform distribution, which is quite sufficient to formulate strong classification criteria.
Discussion
To summarize, our empirical analysis of real-world data (using the zsniff tool) has demonstrated the feasibility of reliably distinguishing among various types of compressed data encodings. Specifically, we can distinguish among deflate-coded text/markup, deflate-coded image data (png), and deflate-code PE. Combined with prior capabilities to detect jpeg and mp3 encodings, we have the solid beginnings of an advanced fragment classification framework that can cover almost all the data encodings observed in our test corpus.
We should note that simply decoding any compressed block and analyzing it in source is not a practical approach. The reason is that the compressed blocks are often not selfcontained and reference data from previous blocks. Brown (2011) discusses this problem in the context of data recovery.
Due to space limitations, a number of lesser statistical studies have been omitted. For example, one potentially useful classification feature is the length of the code words for each code. Shorter codes indicate higher frequency and vice versa. Thus, we can treat code word lengths as a crude histogram sketch of the symbol distribution in the source.
Performance is an obvious concern with any brute-force method, such as our decoding attempts. The key to making it work in a reasonable amount of time is to fail as quickly as possible on bad input. On actual deflate data, the current quick-and-dirty implementation of zsniff can run at about 5-6 MB/s on a single core.
On random data, our control and worst-case performance scenario, it works considerably slower. As one would expect, the tool occasionally decodes plausible Huffman code tables (false positives). The good news is that we never encountered two apparent compressed blocks that are back-to-back (as they appear in true deflate data). This observation is something to be explored further as it can help reduce false positives.
Conclusions
This work makes several contributions to the field Improved methodology. We analyzed the shortcomings of prior work and showed that it has a fundamental flaws in its assumptions. We corrected these foundational problems by reformulating fragment classification as a set of three autonomous problems that are to be pursued and evaluated independently.
New reference data set. We built and validated a set of some 20,000 MS Office 2007 files that can be used for research purposes by the community.
New tool for parsing deflate-encoded data. We built a robust tool that can automatically discover deflate-coded data, generate a number of useful statistics, and (optionally) can decode the data.
Empirical analysis of deflate-coded data. We developed a new methodology for characterizing the encoded data by using information from the Huffman compression tables. This analysis shows that coding tables for text/markup, image data, and Windows executables have distinct signatures and can be readily distinguished. Further, we quantified the relationship between fragment size and expected optimal classification performance on deflatecoded data. 
